From the foundation of the International Committee of Historical Sciences in 1926 to the beginnings of World War II, the question of the role of history and historians to preserve peace throughout the world had been omnipresent. History can be an instrument of war, but it can also be an instrument of peace. After First World War, Nationalist’s histories were seen as responsible for the passions that had led to the Great War. In the 1920’, International cooperation in the field of historical sciences appeared as a condition for European reconstruction and the maintain of peace between former enemies’ nations. The phenomenon took roots in the late nineteenth century when universalism and internationalist ideals had a particularly strong hold over scientists. The ideals went further than the belief that knowledge could transcend national boundaries. Scientists were convinced that they were working for the betterment of the human conditions. International scientific organisations could become models for international associations generally, and even for a world government. In the interwar period, history appeared to be an instrument of peace when built on an international basis. For this reason, the ICHS considered itself as an example for universal cooperation that could be applied to the world. Governments and international organisations such as the League of Nations also saw history as a way to preserve peace throughout the world in so far as it can enable mutual understanding. The aim of this paper is to examine how history was conceived as an instrument of peace by historians and politics, how these conceptions were linked to internationalist ideals, and how these were concretely translated into historical practices through the example of the ICHS.

The historiography on the history of the First World War is now almost impossible to keep track of. This also applies to discussions of war guilt, such as those initiated by Fritz Fischer in particular with his groundbreaking study 'Griff nach der Weltmacht' (Düsseldorf 1961). Although he was sometimes accused of this, Fritz Fischer did not advocate the sole guilt of the German Empire in the subsequent, sometimes fierce controversy. However, he strongly emphasized its offensive war aims. The German-English historian Annika Mombauer has differentiated and modified F. Fischer's positions, especially in her summarising study 'Die Julikrise. Europas Weg in den Ersten Weltkriegs' (München 2013). However, both she and Gerd Krumeich, 'Juli 1914' (Paderborn 2014), continue to assume that the German Empire and the Central Powers, in particular Emperor Wilhelm II and the general staff of his army around Helmuth von Moltke and Erich von Falkenhayn, were primarily to blame. The First World War was by no means an “accident”, but on the contrary, those responsible in 1914 “knew exactly what they were doing”, especially the “belligerent military” - A. Mombauer emphasizes this towards the Australian- British historian and Prussia expert Christopher Clark. However, his bestseller, ‘The Sleepwalkers’ (London 2012 / München 2013), has received widespread attention, particularly in Germany. In parts of the German press and public, this book has been cited and discussed as a refutation of F. Fischer's theses. C. Clark indead offers important and new insights into the history of diplomacy in the run- up to the First World War, particularly with regard to the role of Russia, its ally France and the military there. In this respect, his studies can and should also be used to further differentiate the Fischer thesis. However, he only discusses the question of war guilt very briefly and in abbreviated form in the concluding pages of his book, and this has received little attention in public discussions. He also pays too little attention to the decisive relevance of the modified Schlieffen Plan for the start of the war in the West by the German Empire against a democratically governed France and in this respect inadmissibly downplays the primary importance of this plan for the issue of war guilt. In a more structural-historical approach, however, its relevance for the immediate start of the First World War can hardly be overestimated. It is true that Kaiser Wilhelm II's 'blank assistance check' for an attack by the Austro-Hungarian monarchy on Serbia after the assassination in Sarajevo had already prepared and initiated the path to war and world war. According to G. Krumeich and against C. Clark, Russian threats and partial mobilizations should then be seen as “armed diplomacy” in the traditional style and not as “actual military action”; they therefore “by no means meant the abandonment of political efforts to find a peaceful solution”. The decision to attack Luxembourg, Belgium and France and the military start of the First World War, on the other hand, was clearly enforced by the German General Staff, by H. v. Moltke and War Minister E. v. Falkenhayn - against Wilhelm II, who resisted this at the very last moment, albeit in vain. Predictably, the attack on Belgium in particular led to Great Britain joining the war alongside France and thus also Russia. Thus, the Schlieffen Plan, which the General Staff had defined as strategically without alternative, with its logic of aggressive war in the West against France, resulted in the extensive elimination of remained civilian political decision- makers in the German Empire vis-à-vis the now leading military leaders there. With the offensive war of aggression against France through Belgium, the German Chief of Staff H. v. Moltke began the world war with the objective of the modified Schlieffen Plan - to first defeat France by encircling it from the north and only then to continue the two-front war against the Russian Tsarist Empire. As is well known, this failed as early as September 1914 in France, particularly on the Marne, and then led to several years of position and trench warfare on the Western Front, with the cruel and lossy battles of Verdun and the Somme in 1916. Ludendorff's ultimately strategically hopeless offensives in the spring and summer of 1918 were also an attempt to revive the Schlieffen Plan, in part with further modifications. They ultimately led to the defeat of the German Empire in the First World War - and its end through the democratic-social German revolution of 1918/19.

- A didactical chart, which attempts to graphically illustrate the respective shares of guilt in the beginning First World War, could be a relevant contribution to mediations, especially of the problem of war guilt, and support differentiation and consensus orientation in research discussions.
(Chart Attached in File)

The intention of this didactic sketch is not only to initiate discussions on possible weightings of war guilt graphically and didactically, but also to advance them. Its design allows for the inclusion of controversial positions, and it remains explicitly open to further graphic differentiation in details, to modifications and alterations. Discretionary leeways can also be used didactically. In this way, the diagram can and should contribute to breaking up controversial positions that have become entrenched in historians' disputes and to developing possible syntheses

As the field of peace history awakens to its provincializing moment, scholars are increasingly demonstrating how activists and networks from across the global South opposed war and violence throughout the latter half of the 20th century. Arguably, historians are moving beyond expressions of peace from postcolonial nations, like the idea of ‘moral violence’ introduced by Indonesian President Sukarno at the 1955 Bandung Conference. This paper assesses the work of historians seeking to overcome Eurocentric models and chronologies of peace activism and peace movements. It has three aims. First, it briefly sketches the broader historiography of peace history by demonstrating how Eurocentric perspectives slowly give way to more global ones. I then touch upon three key aspects that global peace history historians grapple with: scale, definitions, and fault lines. Finally, I assess the potential of global peace history for the fields of global history and peace studies. I argue that peace activism in the decolonizing world cannot simply be added to ‘canons’ of peace history, nor can concepts from peace studies be bluntly applied to global peace history. Instead, definitions of and engagements with peace must be historicized and localized worldwide to build new approaches that take the global South as a starting point.